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as to obtain comparative data, is perfectly
practicable and may be carried on in such
a way as to impose no burden upon litigat-
ing parties.
In the circuit court in Detroit, the judg-
es have been experimenting with a new
system of handling mechanics' lien cases
and have developed a very effective plan.
The old method of litigating all the formal
issues involved in such cases produced
very unsatisfactory results. Therefore
they tried having the litigants represented
in court by attorneys without witnesses,
who wererequired to state their respective
positions. The stenographers take down
these statements, on the basis of which the
court determines and fixes the precise
points in actual dispute. These are usual-
ly few and simple in lien cases. The case
is then referred for the taking of deposi-
tions on the real issues so ascertained, and
the evidence when prepared goes to the
judge for decision. By this means many
cases may proceed simultaneously under
the direction of a single judge.
The presiding judge of the Detroit cir-
cuit court, being of an experimental frame
of mind, has recently suggested to the bar
of the city that if they desire it, he will
assign a judge to handle other kinds of
equity cases in the same way, in order to
try out the feasibility of this system for
dealing with general equity litigation.
I think a sympathetic judge can do a
great deal in the way of encouraging very
profitable experimentation, without any
real hardship to parties.
The third sort of data available is the
observation of the results of various meth-
ods employed under different conditions
all over the world. This will require the
co-ordination of many observers and ne-
cessitate the development of a comprehen-
sive system of statistics. Legal statistics
have never received adequate attention be-
cause they have never had a place in the
traditional system that depended only on
precedent.
If legal research could be successful in
carrying on a systematic study of these
various processes, methods, and experi-
ments, in as thorough a way as studies are
constantly carried on in medicine, and, in
fact, everywhere outside of the law, I
think it would go far towards restoring
the prestige of the legal profession, and
would give society what it is entitled to re-
ceive in the way of public service from
the profession.
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C OURTS of review have now becomehighly specialized parts of our judicial
system. This was not the case in the earli-
er history of state and federal judicial sys-
tems. During the greater part of the pe-
riod between 1818 and 1848 the Supreme
Court of Illinois was composed of judges
who did trial work as well. When Con-
necticut, in 1806, separated judicial func-
tions from those of the executive and leg-
islative departments, provision was made
that the judges of the superior court (the
trial court) should constitute the Supreme
Court of Errors. 1 During a long period
under the federal system, justices of the
United States Supreme Court went upon
circuit.
Some vestiges still remain of the union
of trial and appellate work. In Connec-
1 See Reporter's preface to 1 Conn., at p. xxii.
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ticut, judges of the Supreme Court of Er-
rors are also judges of the superior court,
but they have long ceased to act in the tri-
al of cases. The chief justice and asso-
ciate justices of the Supreme Court of
New Jersey (who are also members of the
Court of Errors and Appeals) are by law
charged with general trial duties, but ad-
ditional judges have been provided to hold
circuit court in the absence of a justice of
the Supreme Court. In Maine until re-
cently the justices of the Supreme Court
performed trial duties, but they were
largely relieved of these duties by an act
of 1929 enlarging the jurisdiction of the
superior courts.-
Massachusetts presents peirhaps the
most interesting illustration of a gradual
severance of trial and appellate jurisdic-
tion. The Supreme Judicial Court of that
state had and exercised, as late as fifty
years ago, original jurisdiction in impor-
tant actions at law, and had exclusive ju-
risdiction in equity suits. By transferring
such jurisdiction to the superior court or
by authorizing the Supreme Judicial Court
to make such transfer, most of the trial
work has been gradually shifted to other
courts. Jury terms of the Supreme Judi-
cial Court have ceased, and it has had the
opportunity to concentrate more definite-
ly upon problems of appellate review, al-
though the judges of this court still per-
form numerous trial functions.2
Through processes such as have just
been indicated; trial and appellate func-
tions have largely been separated. In
some cases, as in Connecticut, appellate
tribunals have been given no original ju-
risdiction, but in others, certain cases, may
still be originated in the appellate tribu-
nals. 'The original jurisdiction of the
United States Supreme Court is limited to
small scope by the Federal Constitution,
4
but in states where there is a wider scope
of original jurisdiction, courts of review
have ii many cases found it necessary to
2 Laws of Maine, 1929, pp. 110-116.
3 First Report of the Judicial Council of Mas-
sachusetts 1925, pp. 10-14; Third Report, 1927,
p. 47. Mass. Statutes, 188:3, ch. 223. For the
development of the equity jurisdiction of the
Supreme Judicial' Court before 1883, see Edwin
11. Woodruff, Chancery in Massachusetts, 5
Law Quarterly Review, 370 (1889).
4 Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch. 137 (1803).
protect themselves by advising parties to
seek their remedies in the trial court, un-
less the issue sought to be presented is of
great public importance.
In the growth of an appellate organiza-
tion independent of that for the trial of
cases, there has been a tendency to have
different judges for the two sets of courts.
This result has come about partly as a
matter of policy and partly because of the
.pressure of appellate business. In Illi-
nois, judges of the Appellate Court. (the
intermediate court of review) are desig-
nated from the circuit court, and are pre-
sumed to combine trial and appellate work,
and in the less populous appellate districts
they do this, although the mass of busi-
ness in Chicago renders such a union of
functions substantially impossible. In
New York, justices of the Appellate Di-
vision are designated from among the jus-
tices of the Supreme Court (the trial
court) but are constitutionally restricted
in the exercise of trial functions.5 Obvi-
ously, where the same judge performs
both trial and appellate duties, it is, neces-
sary to adopt some nile by which he shall
not, as an appellate judge, pass upon his
actions as a trial judge. But embarrass-
ment may arise where a number of mem-
bers of the court of review have acted up-
on a case in its earlier stages. In New
Jersey the Supreme Court ordinarily sits
in three parts (of three judges each) I but
recently the nine justices, by sitting in
banc upon a case, prevented its review in
the Court of Errors and Appeals, because
nine of the sixteen members of that court
had disqualified themselves by passing up-
on the case in the lower court.'
Normally, if a court of review is com-
posed of five, seven, or nine members, no
particular hardship is occasioned by the
fact that one member disqualifies himself
by action below, and the difficulty is not
insuperable, even with a higher court of
three, as is the case with the Illinois Ap-
pellate Court. Nor would such disquali-
5 New York Constitution, art. VI, sec. 2.
6 Rule 150 in 2 N. J. Misc. R. 1256.
7 In re Hudson County, 144 Atl. 169 (1928).
The Court of Errors and Appeals is composed
of sixteen members, the chancellor, the chief
justice and eight justices of the supreme court,
and six specially appointed judges who need not
be lawyers.
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fication occasion difficulty where other
judges may be brought in to replace the
disqualified member. But the establish-
ment of courts of review with separate or-
ganization and separate personnel has
been little influenced in this country by
the fear that prejudice may exist because
a member of the court has already com-
mitted himself by presiding at the trial of
a case. The development of specialized
courts of review has been primarily oc-
casioned by the constant and increasing
pressure of judicial business.
It has not been possible to meet the pres-
sure of increasing judicial business mere-
ly by separating the trial and appellate
functions. The Illinois experience illus-
trates some of the other devices employed.
In 1848, a Supreme Court was constituted
whose members, three in number, were
freed from all trial duties. The member-
ship of this court was increased to seven,
and intermediate Appellate Courts were
authorized in 1870. The intermediate
courts were created in 1877, and have pre-
sented the continuing problem of adjust-
ing the division of appellate business be-
tween the Appellate and Supreme Courts.
Four Appellate Courts were originally
provided, of three judges each, but for the
Chicago district this intermediate court
now sits in three divisions and requires
substantially all the time of nine judges.
The continuing pressure of business upon
the Supreme Court made it necessary in
1927 to provide for two Supreme Court
commissioners to aid in the work of that
court. Each device-has in its turn tem-
porarily relieved the situation, but soon a
new device must be found.
By constitutional change or by statute,
an effort has been made to handle increas-
"ing appellate business in the several states
by (1) increasing the number of judges of
the highest state courts; (2) by authoriz-
ing such courts to sit in sections or divi-
sions; (3) by creating intermediate Ap-
pellate Courts.8 The membership of the
highest state court is in many cases limit-
ed by constitutional provision, and where
constitutional amendment is difficult, or
8 For details as to use of these methods be-
fore 1920, see Illinois Constitutional Convention
Bulletin No. 10 on The Judicial Department,
pp. 806, 807.
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temporary relief alone'is sought, Supreme
Court commissioners have often been pro-
vided to aid in the work of the court. In
a number of states the highest courts are
now authorized to sit in sections or divi-
sions.
In some states efforts have been made
by constitutional and statutory provisions
to meet the increasing burden of appeals
by providing for temporary additional
judges, or for additional courts to be tem-
porarily created. In New York the Con-
stitution provides that "whenever and as
often as a majority of the judges of the
Court of Appeals shall certify to the gov-
ernor that the said court is unable by rea-
son of the accumulation of cases pending
therein to hear and dispose of same with
reasonable speed, the governor shall des-
ignate not more than four justices of the
Supreme Court to serve as associate judg-
es of the Court of Appeals." In Virginia
constitutional provision is made for a spe-
cial Court of Appeals in such cases. The
Ohio Constitution provides for the ap-
pointment of a commission of five mem-
bers, upon the application of the court, t6
aid it in catching up with its work. An
increased use of personnel, without in-
creasing the number of judges, is permit-
ted in the superior court of Pennsylvania,
which may "designate two of their mem-
bers to write opinions during the sessions
of said court, and, when this is done, these
members shall not be required to sit at the
hearings and take part in the examination
and decision of any appeal being heard
during that time." 1
The problem of increased complexity of
appellate organization is not peculiar to
the more populous states of New York,
Illinois, Pennsylvania and Ohio. Tennes-
see's Court of Appeals presents the same
problems of jurisdictional relationship as
do the Appellate Courts of Illinois. Geor-
gia and Alabama have intermediate ap-
pellate courts. Louisiana has such a court,
and has experimented with the plan of
having its Supreme Court sit in divisions.
The Supreme Courts of Florida and Mis-
sissippi each sit in two divisions, and in
Mississippi the circuit court acts to some
extent as an intermediate court of review.
9 Pennsylvania Statute Law, 1920, § 20,262.
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In Virginia for several years there has
been a special Court of Appeals, and the
Supreme Court of Appeals in 1928 adopt-
ed a rule under which "the court will sit
either in bank or in two divisions." 11
Nor does a single state limit itself to
only one of the methods indicated above.
Missouri has three Courts of Appeal; its
Supreme Court sits in divisions; the Su-
preme Court and two of the Courts of Ap-
peal are aided by commissioners. Texas
presents perhaps the most striking illus-
tration of appellate organization. It has
a Supreme Court of three members; a
Commission of Appeals of six members;
a Court of Criminal Appeals of three
members; a Commission of Criminal
Appeals of two members; and eleven
Courts of Civil Appeals, of three members
each. The state appellate organizations
have grown in a purely haphazard man-
ner, without specific plan as to the work
to be done or as to the organization to do
the work. The same statement applies to
the earlier development which largely
.separated appellate jurisdiction from that
for the trial of cases.
It is easy to say, and it is true, that a
greater emphasis on efficiency in the trial
courts should materially lessen the num-
ber of appealed cases, and permit a. sim-
plification of appellate organization, and
that steps should properly be taken to dis-
courage unnecessary and dilatory appeals.
But we shall not accomplish any results
by such statements, and we shall not over-
night change the conditions which we now
face. After all, our people are litigious,
and do not desire to admit defeat until the
final appeal has been disposed of. More-
over, the constant increase in regulatory
legislation brings a steady stream of new
problems that must finally, be solved by
the highest court.
. Courts of review are a necessary part
of the judicial system. From 1776 to 1846
no court of review existed in Georgia, and
each trial judge was the final authority in
the cases brought before him. But this
led to such difficulties with respect to the
uniform application of the law through-
out the state that the trial judges them-
selves met together at intervals for the
10 150 Va. p. iv.
purpose of "advising with each other, and
discussing freely and fully all questions
of a doubtful and complex character which
might arise before each in their respective
circuits, and thereby to enable each judge
to decide such question in the law of the
united wisdom of the whole Georgia
bench." 11 Moreover there are dangers
in a judicial system which imposes no re-
straint upon the trial court, as England
discovered before the passage of the
Criminal Appeal Act 12 of 1907.
Assuming that some system of appel-
late review is necessary, what results are
to be accomplished by such review? A
court of review performs several func-
tions: (1) It passes upon errors claimed
to have been committed in the trial of cas-
es, to the prejudice of litigants; (2) in act-
ing upon such cases, it determines the
standards of trial courts, and keeps the
procedural and substantive rules they ap-
ply within certain limits which it regards
as proper; (3) it determines, if it is the
final court of review, what is the law of
the jurisdiction. The emphasis placed up-
on these several purposes may to some ex-
tent determine both the procedure and the
organization of appellate courts.
The case of Jones v. Smith presents it-
self to the court of review in the guise of
a specific contest as to private interests.
Often it is merely this. In criminal cases
there is always an interest in rendering
justice to the accused, and this is the basis
for an automatic review under the law in
South Africa,' 3 in criminal cases in which
the defendant does not appeal. Through
the acquisition of the Virgin Islands, a
similar automatic appeal in death cases has
come into the law administered by feder-
al courts.1 4 Yet courts of review do more
than decide the rights of the parties in par-
ticular cases. Under our theory of law
the issue between parties is the essential
11 For an account of the Georgia experience,
see Justice Joseph R. Lamar in American Bar
Association Journal, X, 513 (1924).
12 Holdsworth, History of English Law, 3d
Ed., vol. I, p. 217. In Louisiana there was no
appeal in criminal cases from 1812 to 1843.
L3 F. G. Gardiner, The South African System
of Automatic Review in Criminal Cases, 44 Law
Quarterly Review, 78 (1928).
141Braffith v. People of Virgin Islands, 26
Fed. (2d) 646 (1928).
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matter. The parties furnish the arena,
the issues, and the weapons with which
the battle is fought, but the result may be
and often is of great consequence to so-
ciety as well. Cases must not be collusive,
but they may be made, and frequently
they are merely the means of settling im-
portant questions of public policy and-of
private law.
In The Business of the Supreme Court,
Professors Frankfurter and Landis prop-
erly say of the United States Supreme
Court:
"The Supreme Court is the final au-
thority in adjusting the relationships of
the individual to the separate states, of
the individual to the United States, of the
forty-eight states to one another, and of
the states to the United States. It medi-
ates between the individual and govern-
ment; it marks the boindaries between
state and national action." 15
The highest state court in each state al-
so mediates between the individual and the
government in many matters of public
policy, and is the most influential factor
in determining and applying the private
law within the state. The adequate per-
formance of appellate duties requires the
prompt and satisfactory determination of
private controversies, but it requires more.
The appellate function of controlling and
making uniform the application of law
throughout the territorial limits of the
state may perhaps be regarded as merely
an incident to the determination of issues
between private parties, but it involves
more than this. Uniformity in the almin-
istration of the law was the primary rea-
son for conferences of the trial judges in
Georgia before the creation of a court of
review in that state.
The several functions of courts of re-
view present different problems, although
the performance of the several functions
may be involved in the disposition of the
same case. Promptness, freed from un-
due technicality, is of the essence in set-
tling the private rights of individuals in-
volved in the particular case. For this
purpose it is desirable to have the point of
view of the trial court, and it is of value
for those who sit in review to have some
continuous experience with the actual tri-
al of cases-an experience which has been
largely lost with the creation of separate
courts and the assignment of separate
judges to appellate work. Because of
their seclusion from trial experience, ap-
pellate judges often tend to become over-
technical in their judgment upon the work
of trial courts.
In determining where the line is to be
drawn between prejudicial and harmless
error, consideration must be given to the
difference in character between trial and
appellate proceedings. The trial court
hears the witnesses, and in many criminal
and common-law civil cases acts with a ju-
ry. The trial court must act promptly and
must rule in the excitement of a trial, with-
out an opportunity to study printed ab-
stracts of all evidence or printed briefs on
the legal issues involved in the case. In
criminal cases the judge must often be-
ware of systematic efforts to trap him in-
to reversible error. Errors of one kind
or another are certain to occur in any long
and hotly-contested case, no matter how
competent the judge; to insist upon a rule
of perfection defeats justice and promotes
technicality and delay.
. A court of review passes upon the trial
court's action free from the excitement of
the trial, with a printed transcript or ab-
stract of the record before it, and Mth
printed briefs presented for its considera-
tion. Counsel for appellant or plaintiff in
error regards it as his duty to go through
the record of the trial court with a fine-
tooth comb, and to maknify errors or al-
leged errors. The court of review may
have the complete record before it, but it
rarely goes behind the printed abstract
where there is one, and is in fact often-
times not trying the case below, but a
summary of the record of what happened
below. Under these circumstances it may
at times become too technical, and fail to
consider the limited bearing of what may
have been an error in the trial 'court.
Some courts of review have unfortu-
nately adopted- the Exchequer rule, under
which errors below are presumed to be
prejudicial.1 6 Such a rule is improper.
It delays justice between the parties, and
]. Frankfurter and Landis, The Business of 16 For an effective criticism of this rule, see
the Supreme Court, p. 308. Wigmore on Evidence, 2d Ed., § 21.
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breeds unnecessary litigation. Interest in
a prompt and satisfactory settlement of
litigation should prompt a disregard of
all technicalities. But-a disregard of all
errors not actually prejudicial in particu-
lar casies may result at times in a failure
of the court of review to, perform its func-
tion of preserving substantial uniformity
in judicial administration. Occasionally
a trial court will violate express and clear-
ly established statutory rights of a party;
and a court of review, although feeling
that the error was not actually prejudicial
in the particular case, may regard, a revers-
al as necessary in order to enforce com-
pliance with the law. Mr. Justice Kalisch
based a dissent in a recent New Jersey
case on the ground (in part) that the giv-
ing of admittedly improper charges in
murder cases "evinces a marked tendency
to perpetrate error, notwithstanding the
court's pronouncement in the matter, and,
unless checked, will ultimately lead to
flagrant miscarriages of justice." 11
Frequency of reversal may result (1)
from too severe a standard in courts of
review, or (2) too lax a conduct in the tri-
al court. An impartial critic has called at-
tention to the fact that in one recent ad-
vance sheet of the North Eastern Report-
er fifteen criminal cases were passed upon
by the Supreme Court of Illinois, of which
eleven were reversed and remanded; and
adds that "the instant group of cases dem-
onstrates clearly that the main responsi-
bility cannot be laid at the door of the Su-
preme Court. Not a single on6 of the elev-
en reversals can fairly be called technical.
The most striking feature of these cases
is the lawless conduct of prosecutors and
judges, and the ignorance or perversity
which their rulings or instructions por-
tray." 1 In view of such facts the court's
duty in preserving an adequate adminis-
tration of justice will sometimes conflict
with its duty to dispose of cases promptly
and without technicality. But this possi-
ble conflict has little bearing. upon the
problem of appellate organization.
-A more important problem presents it-
self, however, when we consider that ap-
pellate courts are not only (1) deciding in-
17 State v. Martin. 102 N. J. Law, 388, 399-
400 (1925).
18 42 Harvard Law Review, 566, 568 (1929).
dividual cases, but also (2) through opin-
ions in such cases, determining the prin-
ciples of law applicable to future cases.
For the first, promptness is essential, for
the second, deliberation is necessary. The
decisions of higher courts are generally
supported by reasoned opinions, which
are published and cited as establishing
principles for the solution of future judi-
cial contests. Cases are presenting them-
selves in such numbers that in most juris-
dictions it is now impossible for a single
court with a small number of members tc
prepare adequate opinions in support of
its decisions. For this reason we have
courts sitting in divisions, and intermedi-
ate appellate courts. With these and other
devices, however, we appear to be prima-
rily increasing the bulk and reducing the
quality of printed opinions.1 9
Naturally, the opinions of intermediate
appellate courts do not have the same
weight as opinions of the highest court,
and in some cases statutes have expressly
provided that opinions of such courts
should have no weight in proceedings oth-
er than those in which they are filed.
2
1
But, nevertheless, the opinions of inter-
mediate courts are reported and are relied
upon in the argument of subsequent cases.
Some states have tried the experiment of
having a court designate its less important
opinions as not to be published, but such
opinions do not escape the all-observing
eye of the West Publishing Company, and
also find their way into independent series
of so-called unreported cases. The only
way to avoid the publication of an opinion
is not to write one.
The bulk of labor involved in appellate
review revolves in large part around the
written opinion. The adequacy with
which the court determines the law of its
jurisdiction through written opinions
varies inversely with the number of opin-
ions to be written. However much a
court may deliberate, the actual prepara-
tion of an opinion is almost necessarily
the work of one judge. The extent to
which an dpinion so prepared becomes in
'9 The Louisiana Constitution of 1913, re-
placed in 1921, provided that "concurring and
dissenting opinions shall not be published."
20 Such a provision exists for the Appellate
Courts of Illinois.
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reality that of the whole court depends up-
on the opportunity for conference among
the judges, before, during, and after the
preparation of the opinion. If the mem-
bers of the court meet only at stated terms,
and then go home to write their opinions,
as is the case in Connecticut, Illinois, and
some other states, individual conference is
necessarily restricted, and correspondence
among the judges is not an effective means
of promoting unity of thought. Where
each member of the court is burdened with
the necessity of constant labor in order to
prepare opinions in cases assigned to him,
there is little time left to consider opinions
written by his fellows, and their opinions
are likely to be concurred in unless strong-
ly opposed. We may thus get opinions ex-
pressing or implying views not concurred
in by all members of the court, and some-
times we have two opposing opinions ap-
proved by the same court at the same time.
Such a situation unsettles the law of the
jurisdiction.
What may be termed "one-man opin-
ions" have been encouraged by changes in
methods of presenting cases to courts of
review. In earlier days an oral argument
before the court, without limitation of
time, was a matter of course in the pres-
entation of a case. McCulloch v. Mary-
land was argued in the United States Su-
preme .Court for nine days. That court
in 1849 with some apparent reluctance
provided that "no counsel will be permit-
ted to speak * * * more than two
hours, without the special leave of court,
granted before the argument begins." It
now limits each side to one hour. The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court allows thir-
ty minutes to each side, as does the Su-
preme Court of California.2 1 In earlier
procedure, printed records and briefs
were largely unknown. To-day they are
generally required. Formal printed argu-
ments have largely replaced the oral ar-
gument, and the printed brief forms the
primary basis for. the written opinion.
The judge to whom the case is assigned
can take the papers in the case home with
-him. Printed -presentation does not in
and of itself discourage conference, but
at least it makes possible. the preparation
21 Pennsylvania, Rule 72; California, Rule
xix.
of opinions without conference among the
judges. Under present conditions a
lengthy oral argument is likely to defeat
its purpose and give little aid to the court.
But oral argument is now almost the only
method of presenting the essentials of a
case to all members of an appellate court,
and most oral arguments are not effective
for this purpose. Moreover, the judges
who listen will usually not have read the
briefs, and will not be well equipped to
follow an oral argument when adequately
made. For this reason the practice has
developed in some states of submitting
most cases without oral argument.
Under the present pressure of appellate
work, it would be substantially impossible
for each member of the court to read the
records and briefs in all cases presented to
the court. What appears as the opinion
of the court thus of necessity represents
in most cases only the opinion of one
member. It is true that the theory of
many states is that no opinion shall be
written until the court as a whole has ar-
rived at a decision, but the facts are other-
wise. Some fifteen years ago the failure
of the whole court to consider the cases
presented to it attracted the active atten-
tion of the Bar Associations of Alabama
and Louisiana, and the Louisiana Consti-
tution of 1921 requires that "at least two
justices shall read each record, and the
conclusions of the court shall be reached in
consultation before the case is assigned for
writing the opinion." 22 Earlier than this
the Supreme Court of California stated
the practice it then followed in the deci-
sion of cases:
"During the service upon this bench of
every member of it, and as we are in-
formed, ever since the organization of the
court, the uniform practice has been as
follows: The chief justice assigns to the
justices in regular order the causes pend-
ing in bank. Each justice to whom a case
is assigned prepares his opinion with or
without consultation with other justices
as he elects. Having prepared and signed
his opinion, it is passed on to his associates
for consideration. If in due course it is
signed by three or more of his associates,
22 78 Central Law Journal, 238 (1914); 18
Law Notes, 63 (1914). Louisiana Constitution
of 1921, art. VII, § 6.
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it then expresses the opinion and judg-
ment of a majority of the court, and when
finally handed to the secretary and by him
transmitted to and filed with the clerk of
the court, it becomes the opinion and judg-
ment of the court.
"The court never convenes as a court,
nor in chambers, in consultation, to ap-
prove opinions so signed previous to their
filing. When they bear a sufficient num-
ber of signatures and all the justices have
examined the same and have had an op-
portunity to express their assent or dis-
sent, they are filed, usually at the instance
of the author." 23
And recently it was seriously contend-
ed in the United States Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Eighth circuit that due
process of law was denied by a decision
of the Supreme Court of Oklahoma, in
which there was a record of approximate-
ly 3,000 pages, and in which the petitioner
averred that four judges concurring with
an opinion by another judge had not "read
a word of the testimony as set out in the
case-made, or as contained in the briefs,
and knew absolutely nothing about the law
or the facts which should have determined
the decision of that case, and were there-
fore unable to concur in any judgment in
the case, and their purported concurrence,
as shown by the record, is a fraud on your
petitioner." 24
In view of the increasing mass of cases,
the appellate courts are faced with a very
practical problem. How are they to de-
termine all cases submitted, and to main-
tain a leadership in the development of the
law? Another answer suggests itself, and
that is to surrender any attempt at leader-
ship, and to have opinions express, not the
judgment of the court as a whole, but only
the views of the individual judge. Ohio
has openly taken a step in this direction,
and other states have less openly reached
the same result. In the Ohio Supreme
Court the judge assigned to prepare the
opinion of the court piepares a syllabus
which is submitted to the other judges be-
fore publication.2 5 "When the syllabus
22 People v. Ruef, 14 Cal. App. 576, 621, 622
(1910).
24 Owens v. Battenfield, 33 Fed. (2d) 753
(1929).
25 113 Ohio State Reports, p. lxxii; 94 Ohio
is finally approved, the decision is an-
nounced, unless one of the judges desires
to present a dissenting opinion." 26 In
Ohio the syllabus, and not the opinion, is
the law of the case. On the whole, the
major interest in Ohio and elsewhere has
been that of keeping up with the docket,
and little attention has been paid to the ef-
fect of judicial utterances upon" the devel-
opment of the law.
Mere mechanical devices, such as in-
creasing the number of judges, do not
solve the problem, and in a single court
successful conference becomes difficult
with a membership of more than nine.
27
But mechanical devices may, and, if prop-
erly used, can aid in the solution' of the
problem. Having a court sit in divisions
means more judges in the same court; the
multiplication of intermediate courts of
review means more judges engaged in ap-
pellate work, though sitting in separate
courts. The use of these mechanisms
nmst be adapted not merely to the mass of
cases to be disposed of, but also to the type
of work to be done.
No effort will be made in this paper to
discuss the relative merits of intermediate
appellate courts and of a single appellate
court sitting in divisions. The two meth-
ods are not mutually exclusive. Missouri
has a Supreme Court sitting in divisions
and intermediate appellate courts as well.
Professor Sunderland has said that the
two chief defects of intermediate courts
are "uncertainty of jurisdiction and double
appeals." 28 But the jurisdictional prob-
lems may readily be exaggerated, even
though we may at once agree that there
are no purely logical grounds upon which
jurisdiction may be divided. And from
the standpoint of adequate consideration
State Reports, p. ix. The Ohio practice ap-
pears to be traceable as far back as 1857.
26 Address of Judge Thomas A. Jones, 24
Ohio Law Bulletin and Reporter, N. S. 324, 333,
338 (1926).
27 The New Jersey Court of Errors and Ap-
peals has sixteen members. The New York
court for the trial of impeachments and correc-
tions of errors, which existed until 1846, was
still larger, consisting as it did of the president
of the senate (who was lieutenant governor),
the senators (32 in 1821), the chancellor, and
the justices of the Supreme Court.
28 E. R. Sunderland, The Problem of Appe..
late Review, 5 Texas Law Review, 126, 138
(1027).
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of important issues of law, the court sit-
ting in divisions presents difficulties, in
that there is little more of a logical ground
for determining when cases shall go from
a division to the full court for considera-
tion.29 Moreover, under the divisional
plan, there is often no single authoritative
determination of the law,10 and counsel
are apt to maneuver their cases into the
division likely to Ibe most favorable. In
addition, if a case goes from one division
to a full court, there is likely to be no clear
new judgment of the full court, because
some of its members have already definite-
ly committed themselves. A single cou~t
sitting in divisions may be the more effec-
tive agency for the disposition of cases,
but it is not likely to establish or main-
tain a leadership in legal development
within the jurisdiction. Moreover, a sin-
gle court sitting in divisions is, for prac-
tical and geographical reasons, out of the
question in the federal system.
Intermediate courts now exist, and will
continue to exist. 1 Assuming their exist-
ence, how can they best be used? The
problem of double appeals is a serious one.
Such appeals make for added delay and
added expense. But the use of an in-
termediate court does permit of an organi-
zation by which the more important cases
may come to the final court of review for
deliberate consideration. A more delib-
erate consideration by the highest court
requires that fewer cases come to that
court, and means that double appeals shall
be limited and a greater degree of finality
."9 For an interesting plan for transfer of cas-
es to the full court, see California Constitution,
art. VI, § 2.
30 New York and Louisiana appear not to have
been satisfied with the experiment of having the
highest court sit in divisions. For New York,
See Frank H. Hiscock, The Court of Appeals of
New York; Some Features'of its Organization
and Work, 14 Cornell Law Quarterly, 131, 133
(1929); and Charles Z. Lincoln, Constitutional
History of New York, vol. II, pp. 585-586. For
an interesting debate on the divisional plan, see
Report of Louisiana Bar Association 1923, pp.
14-100. For the operation of the Washington
court in two divisions, see Journal of the Ameri-
can Judicature Society, vol. 6, p. 177.
31 Difficulties of an administrative character
with intermediate courts multiply with the num-
ber of such courts. In Pennsylvania, where
there it but one such court, the problems are
quite different from those of Ohio with nine,
and Texas with eleven.
attached to the determinations of the in-
termediate court or courts. An effort to
accomplish this result was made by con-
stitutional amendment in Ohio in 1912.
By the Illinois certiorari act of 1909, and
by federal legislation culminating in 1925,
steps were taken in this direction, although
by constitutional provision the Illinois Su-
preme Court has a wide range of compul-
sory jurisdiction, and by statute a lesser
similar jurisdiction is exercised by the
United States Supreme Court. California
has recently taken a step similar to that
in the federal system.3 2  New York has
gone still farther. Speaking of the pro-
visions of the New York Constitution of
1894, Mr. Justice Martin said for the
Court of Appeals :3
"The constitutional convention clearly
entertained the opinion that the continued
existence of the Court of Appeals was
justified only by the necessity that some
tribunal should exist with supreme power
to authoritatively declare and settle the
law uniformly throughout the state. That
court was continued, not that individual
suitors might secure their rights, but that
the law should be uniformly settled, to the
end that the people might understand the
principles which regulated their dealings
and conduct and thus, if possible, avoid
litigation. It was that necessity alone
which induced the adoption of the pro-
visions for a second appeal, and the con-
tinuance of a single court to finally deter-
mine such principles."
And Judge Cardozo has said that the
New York Court of Appeals exists, "not
for the individual litigant, but for the in-
definite body of litigants, whose causes
are potentially involved in the specific
cause at issue. The wrongs of aggrieved
suitors are only the algebraic symbols
from which the court is to work out the
'-' Rule XXX, § 6, effective September 1,
1928. Chief Justice William II. Waste, Giving
Finality to the Decisions of the District Courts
of Appeal, Proceedings of the First Annual
Meeting of the State Bar of California, p. 92
(1928). For recent comments on appellate or-
ganization in other states see Second Report of
the Judicial Council of California, pp. 55-64
(1929).
3 Reed v. MeCord, 160 N. Y. 330, 335 (1899).
The Judicial article of the New York Constitu-
tion was substantially revised in 1925, but not
in a manner to alter the application of this lan-
guage.
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formula of justice." 34 The New York
Constitution of 1894 also sought to limit
double appeals, and to reduce the work of
the Court of Appeals by providing that the
jurisdiction of that court, "except where
the judgment is of death, shall be limited
to the review of questions of law," and
that "no unanimous decision of the Appel-
late Division of the Supreme Court that
there is evidence supporting or tending
to sustain a findi'ng of fact on a verdict
not directed by the court, shall be re-
viewed by the Court of Appeals." But in
1925 the review of facts was extended to
cases "where the Appellate Division, on
reversing or modifying a final judgment
in an action or a final order in a special
proceeding, makes new findings of fact
and renders a final judgment or a final
order thereon." 35  Even the highest
courts of review must bear in mind that
issues of law do not present themselves in-
dependently of the facts.
New York has deliberately made its
Court of Appeals the final body for the
authoritative declaration of the law, and
has planned its appellate organization so
as to enable the court to perform this
function. Under this plan, cases must
usually come to the Court of Appeals
through the Appellate Division, and the
Court of Appeals ordinarily has the aid of
an opinion of the intermediate court. A
result somewhat similar in character is
sought by federal legislation of 1925.36
34 Van Bergh, The Jurisdiction of the Court
of Appeals of the State of New York, p. 19
(1928).
33 Compare art. VI, § 9, of the Constitution of
1894, with art. VI, § 7, as amended in 1925.
The scope of review has a good deal of bearing
upon the amount of work of an appellate court.
In Louisiana the Supreme Court reviews both
the law and the facts. In Connecticut, the Su-
preme Court of Errors limits itself to "the de-
termination of principles of law" and will not
pass upon "pure questions of fact." Styles v.
Tyler, 64 Conn. 432. Between these two ex-
tremes variations occur in the several states;
but in all states the courts must in a great num-
her of cases examine the evidence, even though
they limit, or profess to limit, themselves to is-
sues of law.
36 From the standpoint of review by the Unit-
ed States Supreme Court, the highest state
courts are in effect intermediate courts of ap-
peal. In the federal system itself direct review
from the district courts is more widely permit-
ted than is direct review from trial courts under
the New York system.
Under a system of intermediate courts
of appeal, there is, therefore, some possi-
bility of specialization by the highest court
upon the more important cases involving
the uniformity and the development of the
law. But how effectively can the selection
be made, and is it possible to protect the
highest court so that it may give adequate
attention to such issues? Judge Cardozo
has said: 37
"Of the cases that come before the court
in which I sit, a majority I think, could
not, with semblance of reason, be decided
in any way but one. The law and its ap-
plication alike are plain. Such cases are
predestined, so to speak, to affirmance
without opinion. In another and consid-
erable percentage, the rule of law is cer-
tain, and the application alone doubtful.
A complicated record must be dissected,
the narratives of witnesses, more or less
incoherent and unintelligible, must be an-
alyzed, to determine whether a given sit-
uation comes within one district or anoth-
er upon the chart of rights and wrongs.
* * * Often these cases and others
like them provoke difference of opinion
among judges. Jurisprudence remains
untouched, however, regardless of the
outcome. Finally there remains a per-
centage, not large indeed, and yet not so
small as to be negligible, where a decision
one way or the other, will count for the
future, will advance or retard, sometimes
much, sometimes little, the development
of the law. These are the cases where
the creative element in the judicial process-
finds its opportunity and power."
Obviously there is no automatic means
of selecting the important cases. And
groups of cases important in one period
may become much less so in another.
Freehold cases in Illinois were sufficiently
important in 1870 to justify a constitu-
tional provision that they could be taken to
the highest- state court, but they are not
sufficiently important to-day. In many
states workmen's compensation cases were
properly sent to the highest state court for
direct review, when the cases involved
novel issues of law, but such review may
no longer be necessary when the legal is-
sues have largely been settled, and the
7 The Nature of the Judicial Process, 164,
165 (1921).
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cases primarily involve disputed issues of
fact.
In the adjustment of work between the
final court of review and intermediate
courts, perhaps the best device has been
that of permitting the higher court itself
to determine the cases in which it will take
jurisdiction. Such a plan is usually united
with some power in the intermediate court
to certify cases or issues of law to the
higher court. We have been moving to-
ward a reduction of the higher court's
compulsory jurisdiction and an increase
of its optional jurisdiction. Illustrations
of such a development are found in the
Illinois certiorari act of 1909, the federal
acts of 1916 and 1925, and in the Cali-
fornia rules of 1928. Of course we must
not forget that such a plan devolves upon
the higher court the task of making the
choice."5 This is a burdensome task, but
its performance requires neither oral ar-
guments nor written opinions, and the bur-
den is one that can be borne, if direct com-
pulsory jurisdiction is substantially re-
duced. New York presents an illustration
of such reduction of direct compulsory
jurisdiction, but a similar result has not
been obtained in Illinois and in the federal
system.
With a system of intermediate courts,
a reduction of the compulsory direct ju-
risdiction exercised by the highest court
may accomplish much to restore such a
court to leadership in the legal develop-
ment within its jurisdiction. More time
will be afforded for conference among the
judges; and there is less likelihood that a
court will unanimously declare a statute
invalid, and then on rehearing unanimous-
ly, through the same judge, declare the
statute valid."9 We shall be able to re-
duce the growing evil of rehearings. 40
No court of final review, even though it
has the option of taking cases, can ever
38 There is also the further question as to
whether the court as a whole makes the choice.
Petitions for certiorari may not actually be read
by all the members of the United States Su-
preme Court or of the Supreme Court of illi-
nois, but it is probable that few if any important
cases are overlooked.
30 Halsell v. Merchants Union Insurance Co.,
105 Miss. 268 (1913).
40 Wayne G. Cook, The Rehearing Evil, 14
Iowa Law Review, 36 (1928).
restrict its selection to cases that are of
distinct importance. Many cases will pre-
sent themselves in which a formal written
opinion is unnecessary, except as a tribute
to the lawyers who have presented the
case. The desire of the counsel that rea-
sons be fully stated in their own particu-
lar cases does not sufficiently justify the
burdening of a court with the preparation
of unnecessary opinions, and this is par-
ticularly true in either important or un-
important cases where a satisfactory opin-
ion has been written in the intermediate
court. The Ohio Supreme Court makes
a good deal of use of memorandum opin-
ions, which apparently meet the constitu-
tional requirement that decisions "be re-
ported, together with the reasons there-
for." *The plan of optional jurisdiction
through certiorari is employed in the su-
preme courts of the United States and of
Illinois to decline to entertain cases, with-
out the necessity for a written opinion.
And in cases that are taken for considera-
tion on the merits, the United States Su-
preme Court and the Court of Appeals of
New York properly make an extensive
use of memorandum opinions.
What has just been said should not be
understood to disparage the importance of
written opinions. The preparation of a
written opinion and deliberate conference
thereon promote more careful work upon
the part of any court. My present re-
marks are limited to a final appeal in which
there has already been a determination by
an intermediate court, with the reasons
ordinarily set forth in an opinion by that
court.
Nor should what is said here be con-
strued as minimizing the importance of
intermediate appellate courts. For the
final determination of the law there nmst
be a single, unified command, and that
command must be exercised by the high-
est court of review. Such command, ex-
ercised through an optional jurisdiction,
increases the importance of an intermedi-
ate court. It is true that a refusal to take
jurisdiction does not approve the reason-
ing of an intermediate court's opinion,
4 1
41 For the situation in a single jurisdi&ion,
see Soden v. Claney, 269 Ill. 98; *People v.
Grant, 208 Ill., App. 235; People v. Grant, 283
Ill. 391, 397.
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but merely leaves its decision undisturbed.
But the opinion in reality obtains greater
weight by virtue of the fact that it sup-
ports a final determination, undisturbed
by the higher court. And where, as is
often the case in New York, the Court of
Appeals affirms the judgment of the in-
termediate court on the basis of 'that
court's opinion, the intermediate court ac-
quires an added dignity. Because of such
reliance upon their opinions by the high-
er court, the Appellate Divisions in New
York occupy a higher position than do the
Appellate Courts of Illinois, whose opin-
ions are never approved or adopted in toto
by the Supreme Court of the state or cited
in its opinions.
Although intermediate courts may be
employed, not only to dispose of cases,
but also to aid in a better consideration of
legal issues, mechanical devices alone can-
not produce a better legal product. Cases
must be adequately presented to the court,
and must receive adequate consideration.
Speaking of the increased importance of
economic and social problems in the con-
stitutional issues before the United States
Supreme Court, Professors Frankfurter
and Landis have said:
"If the bar is to fulfill its duties in this
most important domain of law, it must
realize the nature of issues raised by con-
stitutional controversies and be capable of
assisting courts in their solution." 42
But adequate presentation of cases is
needed, not only in constitutional issues
before the United States Supreme Court,
but also in intermediate courts and in the
highest state courts as well. Some oppor-
tunity to examine briefs and to listen to
oral arguments convinces me -that the
court would in a large proportion of the
cases be better off without either. Some-
thing toward the improvement of briefs
may be accomplished by rules of court,
and results seem to have been thus
achieved in Pennsylvania, 43 but rules in
Texas 44 and Illinois similar to that of
Pennsylvania appear to have accomplished
little. Briefs, like opinions, have acquired
added prolixity with the invention of the
412 The Business of the Supreme Court, 315.
.43 Chief Justice Robert Von Moschzisker in
34 Yale Law Journal, :187 (1925).
44 5 Texas Law Review, 56 (1926).
typewriter and the wider use of the ste-
nographer. The court has some remedy
in its hands, and the United States Su-
preme Court ordered the reargument of
several important cases at its last term.
The Supreme Court of Illinois some years
ago struck several briefs from the files,
4 5
but an undue tenderness for counsel re-
strains the frequent employment of disci-
pline of this character, and where such
action is taken, the penalty is in fact more
upon the client than upon the lawyer. The
lawyer as well as the judge owes some du-
ty in the development of the law.
In the adaptation of intermediate ap-
pellate courts, New York and Illinois pre-
sent a striking contrast. In Illinois the
Supreme Court produces some 3,000 pages
per annum of written opinions. In New
York the written product is not more than
one-half as great. Perhaps no great dif-
ference presents itself in the standard of
presentation of cases by counsel., The
New York court receives a greater pro-
portion of its cases from the iihtermediate
appellate courts, and makes an extensive
use of memorandum opinions. The Illi-
nois court makes no use of memorandum
opinions, and writes a second opinion even
though it fully concurs in the results
reached by the intermediate court. The
New York court is in more continuous
session and has a permanent chief justice,
whereas the Illinois judges are together
only for specified terms of court, and the
chief justice changes each year. The New
York court is the master of its task, where-
as the Illinois court is so overwhelmed
with the detail of specific cases that there
is little time for adequate consideration of
the broader problems presented to it. A
system of intermediate courts in the one
accomplishes a result quite different from
'that in the other.
46
4*5 See Dodd and Edmunds, Appellate Juris-
diction and Practice in Illinois, p. 820 (1929).
46 In Illinois, cases are automatically assigned
in order to the several judges, and the same
practice is employed in New York. In Louisi-
ana and in the Supreme Court of the United
States, and in a number of other courts of re-
view cases are assigned by the chief justice.
The automatic assignment is perhaps a natural
development of the plan of annual chief justices
in Illinois. Unlike the courts of Massachusetts,
Connecticut and some other states, the Illinois
court has since 1897 held all of its terms at the
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There is little likelihood of a decrease
in appellate work, either in the federal or
in the state courts. Our judicial system
is topheavy, and places too much emphasis
on appeal. Something to correct this may
be accomplished by reducing technicalities
and penalizing unnecessary appeals. But
whatever is accomplished, we must pro-
vide machinery to dispose of a growing
mass of appellate cases. Little will be ac-
complished by temporary devices to aid
state capital. Upon details as to appellate
work see Journal of the American Judicature
Society, vol. 8, p. 165; vol. 9, pp. 20, 49, 115,
152; vol. 10, p. 57.
in the clearing of congested dockets. We
must face the issue of a more effective ap-
pellate organization as a permanent one.
And in solving the problem of appellate
organization, we must bear in mind that
keeping up with its docket, important as
it is, is not the only function of a court of
review. Under our system of law, courts
are vested with the final construction of
constitutions and statutes, and with the
final determination of rules of common
law. They are charged with a leadership
in the law which they cannot surrender,
and which they are not now organized to
exercise.
Intermediate Appellate Courts
By EDSON R. SUNDERLAND
Professor of Laic, Univcrsity of Michigan
[Address delivered at the Twenty-Seventh Annual Meeting of the Association
of American Law Schools in New Orleans, December 30, 19291
A right of appeal involves the exist-ence of a hi rarchy of courts, and
a hierarchy of courts presupposes a some-
what highly developed political system.
Hence in early times the court of first in-
stance, as the immediate delegate of the
judicial power of the government, heard
and disposed of cases with absolute final-
ity. Such was the situation in Rome in
the simple days of the republic, and it was
only with the more elaborate organization
of the empire that a system of judicial ap-
peals came into existence (Hunter on Ro-
man Law (4th Ed.) 1044). The same sit-
uation was repeated in England. In the
twelfth century there was no appeal from
inferior courts to the king's court, but
there were methods of. removing cases be-
fore judgment. The ecclesiastical courts,
however, deriving their organization from
Roman sources, became a model which
finally brought into existence a civil sys-
tem of judicial review (2 Pollock and
Maitland: Hist. of English Law (2d Ed.)
664,666).
The great number of appeals which re-
sult from modern litigation has made it
necessary in many jurisdictions to increase
the number of appellate judges, and this
has in turn raised the question as to the
most effi-ient manner in which an appel-
late bench can be organized.
Inferior court appeals have usually
been carried to the superior courts of gen-
eral jurisdiction, which have taken care
of such appellate business in addition to
their work as courts of first instance.
Such appeals involve small values, require
prompt decision, and cannot carry a heavy
expense to the parties, and the connonly
employed system of a local rehearing be-
fore a judge of higher grade seems to
meet the situation well enough.
The chief difficulty arises in appeals
from superior courts. Should appellate
jurisdiction be divided, some cases going
to one court and some to another, with a
possible second appeal ? The federal ju-
diciary is so organized, and many states
have adopted the same plan. It is a logi-
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